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THE RULE OF LAW IN THE WORLD
SIR LESLIE KNOX MUNRO*

I am honored to be here on the occasion of the celebration of the
50th Anniversary of the justly-famed Marquette University Law School.
May I congratulate you in the sure confidence that this school will
continue to flourish and to produce men of character learned in the
law.
After many centuries of effort and suffering, we now maintain
the rule of law in the modern democratic state with the help of its
enlightened public opinion, a legislature capable of appreciating and
meeting the need for change, courts whose decisions are enforced and
last, but not least, a police force.
In the nuclear age and in spite of untold sufferings from wars
since the dawn of history, the relations between states are only
imperfectly governed by the rule of law, although a brave attempt
has been made through the United Nations. It will be my purpose
in this address to evaluate the attempt.
I am not overlooking the fact that efforts have been made to
outlaw the use of aggressive force before and apart from the
United Nations. I am not one of those who despise the beneficent
effects of the doctrine of the balance of power which I believe averted
many major conflicts between 1815 and 1914. In particular Britain's
steady support of the principle of the balance of power in the nineteenth century, coupled with the might of the Royal Navy, enabled
the Monroe Doctrine to survive and indeed to flourish in these hemispheres. And until 1914 there was no world war and conflicts like
the Russo-Japanese war were kept within bounds.
But I agree with Mr. Foster Dulles in his speech of January 31
of this year to the New York State Bar Association that any such
balance "is inevitably precarious." I am not so sure that I agree with
all the details of his conclusion, because even today the events leading
to the First World War are a matter for infinite variety of opinion.
"Furthermore," said Mr. Dulles, "balance of power normally implies
a maintenance of the status quo. But history teaches that change is
inevitable. Whatever may be the desire to maintain a balance of
power, the balance inevitably shifts-with results such as those experienced in 1914 and 1939."
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And incidentally, if change is inevitable, that is equally true of this
year of grace.
Between 1919 and 1939 two phenomena afflicted us-the pernicious
notion that a master race under the iron hand of a murderous fanatic
had a mission to rule the world and the even more dangerous and
more lasting menace of a communist clique founded upon materialism,
fanatically believing that its leaders could hasten the course of history
toward the inevitable success of their doctrines, the uncontrolled
masters of a brave and patient people and the unscrupulous heirs to the
messianic ambitions of the Tsars.
In his valuable book "The Common Law of Mankind," Wilfred
Jenks writes with cogency:
The disruptive effects of the Second World War and the
cold war; the challenge which they represent to the basic concepts of a family of nations, the rule of law, and the overriding
claims of common humanity; the striking manner in which they
have destroyed, apparently permanently, the balance of power
among a group of States sharing a common civilization and
common cenceptions of morality which-however rightly we
may, during the period immediately following the First World
War, have criticised its limitations as a device for maintaining
the peace in the absence of an effective international organization-was nevertheless one of the essential foundations of the
community of international law; the scale on which and speed at
which they have released and given opportunities of decisive influence to new political forces which have not yet learned from
the facts of international life the habit of respect for international law; and the extent to which they have created or intensified economic and social problems for which international law is
still in process of finding appropriate solutions: all these factors
have tended to produce a situation of grave uncertainty which
has given rise to widespread and deeply rooted pessimism."
I have said that respect for the rule of law in a state is based upon
an enlightened public opinion within its borders. For the rule of law
to prevail between states, their governments and citizens must be
susceptible to the climate of world public opinion. If they are not,
then the rule of law, in the absence of the use of force, may be and
has been flouted.
The classic cases here are the Suez and Hungarian crises of 1956.
Both these grave affairs bring into question the observance of the
rule of law, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
whereby member states are enjoined to settle their international disputs "by peaceful means in such manner that international peace
and security and justice are not endangered."
It is too early yet to pass a final judgment upon the Anglo-French
intervention or even upon the Israeli incursion. Not all the facts are
known nor have passions died away. The Government which I then

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

represented in the United Nations regarded the measures taken by
Britain and France as an emergency action of a limited nature designed to deal with a situation of great political danger, a situation
likely to deteriorate still further unless checked by drastic action. That
it was police action and no more was, my Government felt, established
from the outset by British readiness, expressed by Sir Anthony Eden,
to hand over Angle-French responsibilities to an effective United Nations force.
However, the feeling of the Assembly was against Anglo-French
policy. Mr. Dulles, in a speech in the Assembly on November 1, 1956,
said that the threatened course of action seemed "inconsistent with the
principles and purposes of the Charter and one which if persisted in
would gravely undermine our Charter and undermine this organization."
The point I wish to make is that the United Kingdom, France and
Israel withdrew their forces from Egyptian territory, not because the
resoluitons passed by the Assembly were legally binding on themthey were not-but because among other reasons, those resolutions
reflected the feeling of a great body of world public opinion. The three
Governments concerned did not ignore the disapprobation expressed
by so large a part of the international community.
During the momentous debates in the Suez crisis I heard the Soviet
delegate denouncing the British, French and Israelis as aggressorsincidentally they were never condemned as such in any Assembly
resolution-and calling upon them to observe the resolutions requiring
them to withdraw. But Marshal Bulganin himself in one of his numerous letters last year to Mr. Eisenhower said that the United Nations
"is not a kind of world government adopting laws and decisions
binding on states." The United Nations is not a super-world government. It is an instrument for its members to use.
If this is true, as normally it is, then the United Nations lacks an
essential power to uphold the rule of law. In great degree, the power
of the General Assembly depends upon its capacity to bring the force
of moral opinion to bear. But the force of world moral opinion is
likely to be effective only in countries within which domestic moral
opinion also can develop. This is true of Britain and France but, as the
events of the Hungarian crisis showed only too clearly, it has no
relevance in the Soviet Union where domestic moral opinion has no
impact or at the most very little on the formation of foreign policy.
The International Court of Justice faces a similar problem. In
saying this I am not minimizing thhe work of the Court which is
indispensable to the establishment of the rule of law in the relations of
soverign states. My learned audience is aware of the limitations upon
the Court's jurisdiction, especially in respect of the domestic affairs
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of a member state of which that state decides it is the sole determinant.
But even more serious are the cases where a state flouts a decision
binding upon it, as Albania has done in the Corfu Channel Case. Since
that case Albania has become a member of the United Nations but still
flouts the judgment.
It is above all the Soviets' scornful rejection of the resolutions
affecting Hungary that led Mr. Dulles, in the speech I have already
referred to, to say "in all seriousness that the United Nations and the
world can, perhaps, survive a limited phase of double standard. But
they cannot survive a permanent double standard. Unless the United
Nations becomes, for all, an instrumentality offered through justice
and law, as it was designed to be, then, as the founders declared, some
alternative must be found."
These are serious words, coming from the representative of the
most powerful member of the free world. I must confess I have considerable sympathy with Mr. Dulles' conclusions. I repeat what I said
last year to the American Society of International Law:
It is my belief that no great Power-and I use the term
'great' here only in its physical sense-can expect to act entirely at its own discretion, heedless of condemnation and openly
in contempt of the public conscience of the world; no great
Power, I repeat, can indulge in this sort of behaviour-as one
great Power has done-and, at the same time, expect that there
will be no impairment of confidence either in its own probity or
in the capacity of the United Nations to preserve peace with
justice. The exercise of lawless violence and a refusal to withdraw from advantages secured by lawless violence can only
diminish the stature and authority of the Charter. Those who
bear great responsibilities should be the first to deny that national expediency can ever justify a deliberate departure from
the imperatives of the Charter. Those who breach the Charter
and, having done so, not only refuse to repair that breach but
seek to lay the blame on others for the consequences of their
own actions are, in my submission, adding to the sin of tyranny,
which is the abuse of strength, the no less reprehensible sin
of hypocrisy.
To have sat, as I have, and listened hour after hour to the Russians and their satellites blatantly justifying the massacre of the
Hungarians is a grim and depressing business. But what, nevertheless, are we to do about it? None of the member states which condemned the Russian action in Hungary was prepared, so far as I know,
to use force to save the Hungarian revolutionaries or to compel the
Soviet to withdraw its troops from Hungarian soil. Indeed it may
well be, as Mr. Lester Pearson has pointed out, that if the opponents
of the Soviet action had intervened by force through the United
Nations, the first victims would have been the Hungarians them-
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selves and the rest of the world might have followed them into the
abyss.
I am aware that many contend that the embarrassments of the
Suez crisis were a deterring factor against aid to Hungary. But given
the ruthless determination of the Russians in Hungary, I doubt whether
even if the Suez crisis had never arisen, the Western world would have
risked a third world war to save the Hungarians. We are living in
an imperfect world whose ability to establish a universal rule of law
is constantly stultified by the division between the Western and communist philosophies.
Under these circumstances I agree with Mr. Hammarskjold:
To turn aside from the United Nations now because it cannot be transformed into a world authority enforcing the law
upon the nations would be to erase all the steady, though slow
and painful, advances that have been made and to close the door
to hopes for the future of world society, toward which present
efforts and experiences should be at least a modest stepping
stone.
The rule of law, indeed, received great impetus from the Suez
crisis: a United Nations Emergency Force was created and the 12th
Assembly, by what I consider was a legislative act, established the
international basis for the payment of the cost of the force. At least
the world organization had a police force, even though it was only on
an emergency and temporary basis and confined to a particular area.
UNEF is of course not the force contemplated by Article 43 of the
Charter, which would, had it been implemented, have given the
Security Council military power to enforce its decisions as the body
primarily responsible for the preservation of the peace. But the Military Staff Committee has failed to reach agreement. Consequently in
the Suez crisis the Security Council had no force at its disposal and
even if it had I believe that a Russian veto would probably have
prevented its use.
Under the circumstances it was the Assembly which acted under
the Uniting for Peace Resolution, that expedient which enables the
Assembly to act quickly where the veto has defeated the Security
Council. Before the events of 1956 the Russians had always challenged the validity of this Resolution as an infringement of the prerogatives of the Security Council. But by an irony of history in the
Suez crisis they joined in invoking the Resolution following the
British and French vetoes in the Security Council. In August of last
year when the situation in Lebanon was before the Security Council,
Russian qualms over the validity of the Resolution seemed to reappear.
The Council's resolution referring the Lebanese problem (and that of
Jordan as well) to the Assembly made no reference to the Uniting
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for Peace procedure. But clearly this procedure was the basis for the
Council's action and the Assembly's jurisdiction.
The resolution passed by the Assembly in August 1958 in respect
of the Lebanese and Jordanian problems was in essence an agreement
by the Arab states to uphold the rule of law in the Middle East. Each
undertook in accordance with the Pact of the Arab League to refrain
from interference with internal affairs of fellow members. There can
be no rule of law if states consider themselves free to subvert the
governments of their neighbors. Yet the history of the years since 1945
is full of such acts of subversion. The resolution of August 1958, if
it continues to be translated into deeds, is of good augury. But events
in Iraq, a key state for Western Europe and an object of Stalin's
ambitions, are the reverse of encouraging. In fact, they are infinitely
serious.
As the result of Russia's constant use of the veto, the Assembly is
growing in power and influence at the expence of the Security Council.
It is the Assembly which is invoking Collective Measures to check
aggression and to establish the rule of law. Of importance and tending to increase the influence of the small states in the Assembly is
the fact that they and not the Great Powers have provided the troops
for UNEF.
The significance for the United Nations of establishment of
UNEF, both generally and in relation to the Middle East, is very
great. At last and as a result of the Anglo-French police action, the
United Nations has a means in the Gaza strip and in the area of
Sharm al Shaikh of making its decisions effective. To some extent we
now have a substitute for the arrangement envisaged in Chapter VII
of the Charter. At the same time, it is important, I think, to keep in
mind exactly what has been accomplished. As I have indicated, the
Emergency Force is in no way a body permanently commissioned to
keep and, if necessary, to enforce the peace. As the Secretary-General
observed in his first report on the Force, "It would be more than
observers' corps but in no way a military force temporarily controlling
the territory in which it is stationed." Presumably UNEF would have
to leave that territory at the request of its government.
The Canadian representative, M. Pinard, said in the 12th session
of the General AssemblyThe United Nations Emergency Force is not so much a
fighting force as a police contingent endowed with international
authority which the United Nations has interposed between forces
which have themselves accepted a cease-fire and the obligation
to withdraw on the understanding that the United Nations
would put its own independent forces into the area to secure and
supervise the cease-fire.
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I do not miminize the importance of the Force, the establishment
of which I regard as more momentous in its way than the creation
of the United Nations force in Korea, of which it might be remembered that first, it was established by the Security Council only
because the Russians were absent from the crucial meeting, and, second, only sixteen nations contributed to the force, the bulk of responsibility falling on the United States, which already had forces in the area.
lkMr. Lester Pearson, in an article in Foreign Affairs (April 1957)
said convincingly: "The type of Security Council action against aggression in Korea, therefore, is not likely to be repeated. In any event,
the United Nations character of that action was as much symbolic as
it was real, because the United States supplied most of the forces
and exercised most of the control over them. In so far as the possibilty of using the United Nations for collective security was concerned, Korea was both an encouragement and a warning." Invaluable
as UNEF has proved, it may not be a precedent for similar action in
the future. During the Lebanese crises there was no enthusiasm in
either the Security Council or the Assembly for the dispatch of anything more than an observer corps to Lebanon. Jordan rejectel the
idea even of such a corps.
Nevertheless, the danger of another emergency has persuaded
many responsible leaders of the necessity for a permanent United
Nations Force as an indispensable instrument for the preservation
of the rule of law, created by the Assembly and at its disposal. At
the Emergency session of August 1958 Mr. Eisenhower in person,
under my Presidency, proposed the establishment of such a force.
I do not minimize the difficulties. Neither the Soviet Union nor,
among others, India will support the idea-the Soviet because it
wishes to preserve the jurisdiction of the Security Council where its
veto can effectively prevent any permanent force being created. Other
states outside the Communist bloc have domestic and external problems into which they have no desire to see the United Nations intrude.
Then there is the question of cost which would be great but in my
judgment a very small insurance premium to pay against the cost in
blood and money of war, either limited or unlimited. Yet during the
12th session, it required considerable negotiation and patience to
secure, on November 22, 1957, the passing of an historic resolution
authorizing the Secretary-General to expend for the period ending
December 31, 1957, an amount up to a maximum of $30 million and,
as necessary, an amount for the continuing operation of the Force
beyond that date up to a maximum of $25 million, subject to any decisions on a review to which I need not refer here.
The Assembly went on-and I quote from its resolution-to "decide" that the expenses thus authorized "shall be borne by the mem-
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bers of the United Nations in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for the financial years 1957
and 1958 respectively." The Assembly adopted the same principle at
its last session.
It is true that in 1957 the Communist bloc and Chile and Ecuador
voted against this resolution and that the Communist countries, whose
contributions to the regular United Nations budget amount to 20
percent of the total, said that they would not contribute their share
of UNEF expenses. But I am of the opinion that the resolution is binding on all Members of the United Nations. Its legal effect will, in the
minds of some, I realize, be debatable, especially since the members
of the Communist bloc have said so uncompromisingly that the resolution is not binding on them, as the "aggressors" alone should pay.
I have already said that Britain, France and Israel have not been
defined by the Assembly as aggressors. It appears to me that since
the Charter provides simply that "the expenses of the Organization
shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly," a Member's failure to pay its due proportion of the expenses of
the United Nations Emergency Force will eventually involve the consequences referred to in Article 19, whereby a Member in arrears in
the payments of its financial contributions to the Organization shall
have no vote in the Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or
exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding
two years.
My audience will realize that if there was difficulty in persuading
some members of the Assembly to pass the November 1957 resolution
with its financial burden, the opposition would be very much greater
if an attempt were made to create a permanent force. Those who
would form such a force would come from the small powers whose
sacrifices would probably be considerable, even allowing for over-all
United Nations expenditure. Mr. Eisenhower's proposal was not
adopted at the 13th session.
At that session, on November 5, Mr. Hammarskjold read a closely
reasoned statement. He said that following upon the establishment of
UNEF, many of the problems which arose in that type of operation
had been solved and the solutions reached had stood the test of experience. He concluded that there was neither reason nor excuse for
the United Nations to be unprepared to meet any new emergency requiring similar treatment.
I agree with the Secretary-General, save that I say that there may
be new emergencies which do not require similar treatment and which
may be solved only if there is a permanent United Nations Force in
being or capable of being called into being speedily and that studies
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should immediately proceed in the United Nations and action speedily
taken on this vital question.
The Secretary-General emphasized "the need for the consent of
the host country, as well as of contributing countries, to any such
operation." In other words, a Peace Supervision Force could enter
a country only with the consent of the Government of this country.
It is pertinent to ask how such a force, having regard to Mr. Hammarskjold's conclusion, could enter Western Berlin, where complicated
legal questions of jurisdiction are involved. They will need political
decision.
The Secretary-General emphasized that his approach to the problem was guided by the strictest respect for the rules of the Charter.
All will accept his emphasis. He went on to say that his approach was
entirely pragmatic and "did not try to freeze a pattern of action, nor
would it give rise to arrangements which might be conducive to a
premature or inappropriate use of similar means in the future." He
emphasized that the political issues involved had to be solved. I repeat that this may have a significance for Berlin.
Nothing further was done during the thirteenth Assembly and
the item entitled "Summary study of the experience derived from the
establishment and operation of UNEF" was disposed of.
This seems to me a rather summary way of dealing with a summary
item following the Secretary-General's valuable statement to the Special
Political Committee.
Political issues come and go. Today they have an awkward habit
of staying with us for a long time. They have arrived in drastic form
in respect of Berlin. In spite of the primary interest and responsibility
of the Great Powers, the United Nations, as the instrument for preserving world peace for small Powers as well as great, is obviously
involved and must be ready to undertake its responsibilities.
I believe, as I have said publicly last year, that we must persist
in attempting to create a permanent force. We must avail ourselves
and learn from the improvisations of the Korean, Suez and Lebanon
crises. I agree with Mr. Pearson that member governments, excluding
the permanent members of the Security Council, should be invited to
signify a willingness in principle to contribute contingents to the
United Nations for purposes that are essentially non-combatant, such
as, for example, the supervision of agreed cease-fires and comparable
peace-supervisory functions.
Yet I believe we may have to go much further than this, and that
soon. We live on a powder-keg. The Berlin crisis is upon us. It may
well be that the United Nations will have to take part in the solution
of that crisis if it is not to burst into ruinous war. A United Nations
force in Western Berlin, comprised of contributions from the smaller

1959)

THE RULE OF LAW IN THE WORLD

countries, fully armed and capable of fighting a defensive action and
with the mission of preserving Western Berlin as a democratic outpost, may well be one solution of the present grave crisis. Of course
such a force would require adequate and uninterrupted passage from
and to the West. If Mr. Khruschev is in earnest, he should agree to
such a force being as well in Eastern Berlin, so that the whole city
could be under United Nations protection and its freedom ensured.
So the present occupying forces could be withdrawn and some degree
of disengagement effected.
Of course there will be difficulties. The Soviet may insist that no
NATO countries should contribute to a Berlin force, thus, for example eliminating Canadian troops, already in Western Europe.
Whether the Soviet should have its way on this point is a matter for
discussion.
If we are to preserve the rule of law in Europe, the establishment
of an effective United Nations force in Berlin would be a substantial
step.
Progress towards the rule of law has been slow and difficult.
Since the end of the Second World War there have been major conflicts and intermittent hostilities. States have been subverted and rulers
assassinated.
Yet there has been progress. Aggression has been checked in
Korea, peace, albebit uneasy, has been established in the Middle East,
in each case under the aegis of the United Nations.
Aggressive war is declared illegal and the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg has held the solemn renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy involves the proposition that such a war
is illegal in international law and that those who plan to wage such
a war, with its inevitable, terrible consequences are committing a crime
in so doing.
Under the trusteeship system considerable areas have advanced and
are advancing to independence or self-government in accordance with
orderly internation process. Individuals can claim the redress of grievances before the Trusteeship Council, a departure from the principle
that international law is purely a matter for states and between states.
In economic and social matters the United Nations and associations like the members of the Colombo Plan tacitly admit that the
rule of law can survive and flourish only if mankind is adequately
fed and nourished in conditions of free and enlightened social development. If man has to choose between liberty and food, he appears
likely to choose food. Without liberty there is no rule of law. This
inference is obvious.
The challenge to us all is great for the stakes are survival. We are
each our brother's keeper. If one state usurps by violence or subver-
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sion, then the rule of law disappears from one section of the world
and the rest is thereby weakened. We in the free world are not so
strong that we can afford its diminution. The areas now subject to
the rule of law must not decrease.

